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The State Secrets Privilege in the 
 Post-9/11 Era 
 
Steven D. Schwinn* 
 
Introduction 
 
On February 9, 2009, a lawyer from the Department of 
Justice stood before a three-judge panel of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to answer a much 
anticipated question in a case involving government 
extraordinary rendition and torture: Would the new 
administration, under President Obama, defend the position of 
the Bush administration and seek complete dismissal of the 
case because it involved a state secret? 
The attorney‘s answer: Yes.1 
This answer baffled many.  After all, President Obama 
came to office promising a new era of government openness and 
transparency.2  He promised to discontinue many of the 
controversial policies in the Bush administration‘s ―War on 
Terror.‖3  Specifically, he promised to reevaluate the 
Government‘s position on the state secrets privilege.4 
The state secrets privilege started as a common law 
evidentiary privilege that protected evidence if there was a 
 
* Associate professor of law, the John Marshall Law School.  Thank you 
to my colleague Professor Walter Kendall for valuable comments on this 
Article.  Thank you to Dean John Corkery and Associate Dean Ralph 
Ruebner for their generous summer research support.  Thank you to the 
editorial staff of the Pace Law Review for allowing me to participate in this 
important volume on national security and the Constitution and for their 
outstanding editorial work on this Article.  All errors are, of course, my own.    
1. Audio file: Oral argument in Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 
563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009), amended and superseded by 579 F.3d 949 (9th 
Cir. 2009), petition for reh’g en banc granted by 586 F.3d 1108, available at 
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_subpage.php?pk_id=0000002777. 
2. See, e.g., Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President on 
National Security (May 21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-Security-5-21-09/. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
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―reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence [would] 
expose military matters which, in the interest of national 
security, should not be divulged.‖5  In the cases involving secret 
executive programs developed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, 
however, the Government has repeatedly pressed to turn the 
privilege into something more like a justiciability doctrine—a 
claim that would foreclose all litigation on a matter when the 
very subject of litigation is a state secret. 
If that is not dramatic enough, the Government also 
presented a new argument in the post-9/11 cases: that the state 
secrets privilege was rooted in the President‘s Article II powers 
in the Constitution.6  This argument amplified the 
Government‘s already sweeping state secrets claims and, if 
accepted by the courts, meant that the administration could 
effectively shut down all judicial challenges against the 
Government, or its partners, based only on the claimed harms 
resulting from these programs. 
The Government‘s arguments predictably spawned 
criticism.  In response, the new administration announced that 
it would review all pending cases in which the prior 
administration had maintained this extraordinary claim.7  
Additionally, Congress reintroduced legislation to rein in the 
administration and control the use of the privilege.8  Given the 
Government‘s continuing position on the state secrets privilege, 
as well as several court rulings on that privilege, the proposed 
legislation falls short. 
This Article examines the Government‘s position on the 
state secrets privilege in the post-9/11 cases.  It argues that the 
Government‘s new position, first under President Bush and 
now under President Obama, marks an important and 
disturbing change in how it considers and treats the privilege.  
In these cases, the Government has dramatically expanded the 
privilege in four discrete dimensions.  First, the Government 
 
5. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953). 
6. See, e.g., Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 1003. 
7. Steven Aftergood, Eric Holder on State Secrets, OLC Opinion, 
SECRECY NEWS, Feb. 2, 2009, 
http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2009/02/holder.html. 
8. State Secret Protection Act of 2009, S. 417, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2009); State Secret Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 984, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2009). 
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has argued that the state secrets privilege has constitutional 
roots.  Next, it has attempted to minimize the roles of the 
courts in policing the privilege.  Third, it has negated private 
litigants‘ interests in their cases against the Government and 
its partners.  Finally, it has argued that courts must 
completely dismiss those cases in which it decrees that the very 
subject matter is a state secret. 
If reform efforts are to succeed, they must take account of 
these characteristics of the Government‘s position, as well as 
the reported decision of one circuit court. 
To appreciate the significance of the changes in the 
Government‘s position, it helps to put them in historical and 
jurisprudential perspective.  Thus, this Article starts by tracing 
the sources of the state secrets privilege.  It shows how the 
contemporary state secrets privilege evolved from two related 
but distinct cases—one creating a complete bar to a very 
narrow category of litigation, and the other creating an 
evidentiary privilege. 
This Article then examines the applications of the state 
secrets privilege in the last three decades, in the cases that 
form the basis of the Government‘s claims today.  I argue that 
the cases fall roughly into two categories, correlating with the 
two sources of the state secrets privilege.  Thus, cases in one 
category treat the privilege as a common law evidentiary 
privilege, while cases in the other treat it more like a 
justiciability issue. 
Next, the Article examines the Government‘s position on 
the state secrets privilege in the post-9/11 cases.  I argue that 
the Government‘s position on the privilege builds on the second 
category of cases explained above.  I also show that the 
Government in these cases makes the novel claim that the 
state secrets privilege is rooted in the Constitution.  As a 
result, the Government claims a dramatically expanded 
privilege, which, if adopted by the courts, could mean that the 
Government could entirely shut down cases, with little judicial 
intervention, merely by asserting that their very subject matter 
is a state secret.  This expanded view of the state secrets 
doctrine lacks support in the history and the precedent of the 
privilege. 
 
3
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I.  The Sources of State Secrets 
 
The state secrets privilege derives primarily from two 
cases: Totten v. United States9 and United States v. Reynolds.10  
But while these two cases share some common ground, they 
represent two entirely distinct principles.  Totten represents a 
complete ban on litigation that involves clandestine 
government contracts, or spy contracts.11  The ―Totten ban‖ 
therefore operates to cut off any litigation on a spy contract on 
the pleadings.12  It is similar to justiciability doctrines that 
prevent the courts from hearing whole categories of cases, 
except that the Totten ban does not have the same 
constitutional pedigree. 
Reynolds, in contrast, is a common law evidentiary 
privilege.  The ―Reynolds privilege‖ therefore protects evidence 
that contains a state secret.13  Unlike the Totten ban, it need 
not end the case, unless an essential claim or defense hinges 
only on protected evidence and cannot be established with 
alternative, non-privileged evidence.14 
This section includes a discussion of the Totten ban and the 
Reynolds privilege, starting with Totten and Reynolds 
themselves.  The section concludes by highlighting the 
differences between the Totten ban and the Reynolds privilege, 
drawing on the Supreme Court‘s most recent foray into the 
area in Tenet v. Doe.15 
 
A. The Totten Ban 
 
Totten brought a claim against the United States on behalf 
of his intestate, William A. Lloyd, for breach of contract.16  
Lloyd contracted with President Lincoln in July 1861 to 
 
9. 92 U.S. 105 (1875). 
10. 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
11. See generally Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2005) (noting the impact 
of the Totten bar and its effect on the claim itself). 
12. Id. 
13. See generally Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10-11. 
14. See generally Tenet, 544 U.S. at 8-9 (explaining the Reynolds 
evidentiary privilege). 
15. 544 U.S. 1 (2005). 
16. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 105 (1875). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/23
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―proceed South and ascertain the number of troops stationed at 
different points in the insurrectionary States, procure plans of 
forts and fortifications, and gain such other information as 
might be beneficial to the Government of the United States.‖17  
Lloyd was Lincoln‘s spy, and the President agreed to pay him 
two hundred dollars per month for his services.18 
Lloyd satisfied his part of the contract, but, after the war, 
the Government only reimbursed him for expenses.19  It did not 
pay him the two hundred dollars per month it owed for his 
services.20  Nevertheless, the Court of Claims ruled against 
Totten and dismissed the case, holding that the President 
lacked authority to bind the United States to the contract in 
the first place.21 
The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, but for different 
reasons.22  In contrast to the Court of Claims, the Supreme 
Court ruled unequivocally that the President had authority as 
commander-in-chief to bind the United States to a spy contract 
during the war.23  But the Court also ruled that the contract 
itself was a secret.24  The Court‘s language is worth quoting at 
length: 
 
The service stipulated by the contract was a 
secret service; the information sought was to be 
obtained clandestinely, and was to be 
communicated privately; the employment and 
the service were to be equally concealed.  Both 
employer and agent must have understood that 
the lips of the other were to be for ever sealed 
respecting the relation of either to the matter.  
This condition of the engagement was implied 
from the nature of the employment, and is 
implied in all secret employments of the 
government in time of war, or upon matters 
 
17. Id. at 105-06. 
18. Id. at 106. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 106-07. 
22. Id. at 107. 
23. Id. at 106. 
24. Id. at 106-07. 
5
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affecting our foreign relations, where a disclosure 
of the service might compromise or embarrass 
our government in its public duties, or endanger 
the person or injure the character of the agent.25 
 
The Court ruled that the secrecy of the contract meant that 
it could not be litigated.26  The Court cited ―public policy‖ to 
justify its holding and explained that if government spy 
contracts could be litigated, the whole secret service operation 
might be exposed, threatening national security and effectively 
shutting down the service.27  In addition, any secret agent, or, 
presumably, even any putative secret agent, could unilaterally 
threaten the entire service by exposing it in any run-of-the-
mill, real or imagined, employment dispute.28  The Court later 
called this threat ―graymail.‖29  Moreover, any suit on a secret 
contract would itself breach that contract, because it would 
reveal the very secret that the contract was meant to 
preserve.30 
The Court dismissed Totten‘s case on these public policy 
considerations alone, without citing a single case or any other 
legal authority in support of its ruling.31  In closing dicta, 
however, the Court suggested a more concrete basis for its 
decision by aligning this new principle with common law 
privileges respecting communications between clergy and 
parishioner, husband and wife, client and counsel, and patient 
and doctor.32  The Court determined that this type of 
communication involves ―matters which the law itself regards 
as confidential;‖ a suit that requires this type of disclosure 
cannot be maintained.33 
 
 
25. Id. at 106. 
26. Id. at 107. 
27. Id. at 106-07. 
28. Id. 
29. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 11 (2005). 
30. Totten, 92 U.S. at 107. 
31. Id. at 106-07. 
32. Id. at 107. 
33. Id. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/23
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B. The Reynolds Privilege 
 
Reynolds involved a negligence claim against the Federal 
Government by widows of civilians killed in the crash of an Air 
Force B-29.34  The plaintiffs moved during discovery for an 
order requiring production of the Air Force‘s official accident 
report.35  The Government opposed the motion, arguing that 
the report was privileged based on an ill-defined claim that the 
proceedings of investigatory boards of the armed services 
should be categorically protected from disclosure.36  The district 
court rejected the Government‘s arguments, suggesting that 
the ―well-recognized common-law privilege protecting state 
secrets‖ might have worked better.37 
The Government took the hint, and the Secretary of the 
Air Force filed a formal claim of the state secrets privilege with 
the district court on August 9, 1950.38  The district judge 
reviewed the report in camera ―so that he might determine 
whether all or any part of the documents contain, to use the 
words of his order, ‗matters of a confidential nature, discovery 
of which would violate the Government‘s privilege against 
disclosure of matters involving the national or public 
interest.‘‖39  The district judge ordered the Government to 
produce the report, but the Government declined.40  The judge 
issued an order ―that the facts in plaintiffs‘ favor on the issue of 
negligence be taken as established and prohibiting the 
defendant from introducing evidence to controvert those 
facts.‖41  The court then held a hearing on damages and 
 
34. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1953).  See also LOUIS 
FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE (2006); BARRY SIEGEL, CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE 
(2008). 
35. Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468, 469 (E.D. Pa. 1950), aff’d 
sub nom. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345 
U.S. 1 (1953). 
36. Id. at 472. 
37. Id. at 471-72. 
38. See Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 990 (3d Cir. 1951), aff’g 
Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1950), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 
(1953). 
39. Id. at 996. 
40. Id. at 990. 
41. Id. at 991. 
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entered judgment for the plaintiffs.42 
The Government appealed, arguing that ―it is within the 
sole province of the Secretary of the Air Force to determine 
whether any privileged material is contained in the documents 
and that his determination of this question must be accepted 
by the district court without any independent consideration of 
the matter by it.‖43  The Third Circuit flatly rejected this claim 
with prescient language: 
 
On the contrary we are satisfied that a claim of 
privilege against disclosing evidence relevant to 
the issues in a pending law suit involves a 
justiciable question, traditionally within the 
competence of the courts, which is to be 
determined in accordance with the appropriate 
rules of evidence, upon the submission of the 
documents in question to the judge for his 
examination in camera.  Such examination must 
obviously be ex parte and in camera if the 
privilege is not to be lost in its assertion.  But to 
hold that the head of an executive department of 
the Government in a suit to which the United 
States is a party may conclusively determine the 
Government‘s claim of privilege is to abdicate the 
judicial function and permit the executive branch 
of the Government to infringe the independent 
province of the judiciary as laid down by the 
Constitution.44 
 
In short, the state secrets privilege was an evidentiary 
privilege to be invoked against evidence, not an entire case, 
with meaningful judicial oversight. 
The Supreme Court in Reynolds affirmed this principle, 
even as it overturned the lower courts on the application of the 
privilege in the case.45  Thus, the Court referenced several 
cases, including Totten, for the proposition that the ―privilege 
 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 996-97. 
44. Id. at 997 (citations omitted). 
45. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/23
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against revealing military secrets . . . [was] well established in 
the law of evidence‖46 and looked to ―an analogous privilege, 
the privilege against self-incrimination,‖ for guidance on its 
application.47  Importantly, nothing in the decision suggested 
that the privilege was rooted in the Constitution or separation-
of-powers considerations.  If anything, such considerations cut 
the other way.  In calibrating the appropriate level of judicial 
oversight, the Court wrote that ―[j]udicial control over the 
evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of 
executive officers.‖48 
The Court used a two-step process to evaluate the formal 
claim of the privilege by the Secretary of the Air Force 
―indicating a reasonable possibility that [state] secrets were 
involved.‖49  In the first step, the Court determined how 
thoroughly to evaluate the claim, which is based upon the 
plaintiff‘s need for information in pursuing his or her case.50  
―In each case, the showing of necessity which is made will 
determine how far the court should probe in satisfying itself 
that the occasion for invoking the privilege is appropriate.‖51 
A significant need—for example, a case where a plaintiff‘s 
claim would fail without the material—results in a significant 
review, including an in camera, ex parte review of the material.  
Moreover, courts should apply great scrutiny: ―[w]here there is 
a strong showing of necessity, the claim of privilege should not 
be lightly accepted.‖52  In contrast, a lesser need—for example, 
a case where a plaintiff might rely on non-privileged material—
results in a deferential review of the claim.53 
As to the first step, the Court ruled that the plaintiffs‘ need 
was ―dubious,‖ because they failed to pursue the underlying 
information about the crash from an alternative and available 
non-privileged source, the surviving crew members.54  As a 
result, the Court ruled that it could evaluate the privilege 
 
46. Id. at 6-7. 
47. Id. at 8. 
48. Id. at 9-10. 
49. Id. at 11. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 11. 
53. See id. (―A fortiori, where necessity is dubious, a formal claim of 
privilege, made under the circumstances of this case, will have to prevail.‖). 
54. Id. 
9
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based upon a deferential review of the Secretary‘s claim alone, 
and not based upon an in camera examination of the report 
itself.55 
In the second step, after evaluating the claim, the Court 
denied access to the report.  At this stage, the Court engaged in 
no balancing.  Instead, the successful invocation of the 
privilege was absolute.  ―[E]ven the most compelling necessity 
cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately 
satisfied that military secrets are at stake.‖56  Presumably, as 
with any other evidentiary privilege, an unsuccessful 
invocation would have resulted in an order to produce the 
evidence. 
The Court‘s denial alone, however, did not end the case.  
The Court remanded the case, permitting it, at least 
theoretically, to proceed on any available non-privileged 
evidence.57 
 
C. The Totten Ban and the Reynolds Privilege in Contrast 
 
The Court did not seriously address the relationship 
between the Totten bar and the Reynolds privilege until 2005, 
when it dismissed another spy case.58  In Tenet v. Doe, two 
foreign nationals sued the director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (―CIA‖) and the United States for failure to satisfy their 
part of the plaintiffs‘ contract for espionage services during the 
Cold War, a case that seemed very much like Totten.59  Unlike 
Totten, however, the plaintiffs in Tenet did not merely allege 
breach of contract.  Instead, they alleged that the 
Government‘s failure to meet an obligation to provide them 
with continued financial support violated their equal protection 
and due process rights.60 
The lower courts ruled that this difference allowed the 
plaintiffs to dodge the Totten bar.  They limited Totten to its 
most narrow facts—a breach of contract claim on a spy 
contract—and ruled that Totten, therefore, did not bar the 
 
55. Id. at 12. 
56. Id. at 11. 
57. Id. at 12. 
58. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005). 
59. Id. at 1. 
60. Id. at 5. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/23
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plaintiffs‘ constitutional claims.61  The Ninth Circuit held that 
Reynolds recast the Totten bar as merely an early and extreme 
version of the Reynolds privilege.62  Both lower courts ruled 
that the Federal Government could exclude evidence based on 
the Reynolds state secrets privilege, but that Totten did not bar 
the suit entirely.63 
The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the case based 
on a rote application of the Totten bar.  The Court ruled that 
the lower courts read Totten too narrowly—that by its plain 
terms Totten applies to all ―lawsuits premised on alleged 
espionage agreements.‖64  Citing Reynolds itself, the Court 
wrote: 
 
―[W]here the very subject matter of the action, a 
contract to perform espionage, was a matter of 
state secret,‖ we declared that such a case was to 
be ―dismissed on the pleadings without ever 
reaching the question of evidence, since it was so 
obvious that the action should never prevail over 
the privilege.‖65 
 
The Supreme Court affirmed that Totten applied only to cases 
involving spy agreements, but it also held that Totten applied 
to any case involving spy agreements, no matter the cause of 
action.66 
 
61. Tenet v. Doe, 329 F.3d 1135, 1145-55 (9th Cir. 2003); Doe v. Tenet, 
99 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1289-94 (W.D. Wash. 2000). 
62. See Tenet, 329 F.3d at 1152-53. 
63. Id. at 1145-55; Tenet, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1289-94. 
64. Tenet, 544 U.S. at 9. 
65. Id. (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 345 U.S. 1, 11 n.26 (1953) 
(citing Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875)). 
66. The Court had previously affirmed the ―more sweeping holding in 
Totten.‖  Tenet, 544 U.S. at 9 (citing Weinberger v. Catholic Action of 
Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139 (1981)).  The Court in Weinberger, 
however, merely quoted and cited Totten as support, and only by analogy, for 
its dicta that the Navy‘s full compliance with portions of the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (―NEPA‖), Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852, 
was ―beyond judicial scrutiny.‖  Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 146.  Ultimately, the 
Court held that whether or not the Navy has complied with NEPA ―to the 
fullest extent possible‖ was beyond judicial review.  Id. at 142.  In other 
circumstances, the Court has stated that ―public policy forbids the 
maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would 
inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as 
11
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At the same time, the Court drew a clear line between 
Totten and Reynolds.  Totten, it ruled, established a complete 
bar to litigation.67  Reynolds, in contrast, established an 
evidentiary privilege.68  In explaining the difference, the Court 
wrote, ―[t]he [Reynolds] state secrets privilege and the more 
frequent use of in camera judicial proceedings simply cannot 
provide the absolute protection we found necessary in 
enunciating the Totten rule.‖69 
The state secrets privilege announced in Reynolds, to be 
sure, drew support from Totten, ―[b]ut that in no way signaled 
[the Court‘s] retreat from Totten‘s broader holding that 
lawsuits premised on alleged espionage agreements are 
altogether forbidden.‖70 
Thus Tenet affirmed what Totten and Reynolds previously 
held and drew a sharp line between them.  The Totten bar 
applies to cases involving a government spy contract; it 
prevents the entire case from going forward.  In contrast, the 
Reynolds evidentiary privilege applies to evidence; it may 
protect evidence that contains state secrets, but it does not 
prevent a plaintiff‘s case from proceeding on the basis of 
alternative, non-privileged evidence. 
 
II.  The State Secrets Privilege: Two Variations 
 
Courts have taken the Totten ban and the Reynolds 
privilege in different, and sometimes surprising, directions.  
But at the end of the day, the cases applying these doctrines 
fall into two categories.  In the first—the ―Reynolds cases‖—
courts, following Reynolds, treat the state secrets privilege as a 
common law evidentiary privilege.  These cases consider an 
assertion of the privilege on evidence, usually in discovery, and 
thoughtfully assess whether and how the case might proceed 
without any privileged evidence. 
 
confidential, and respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be 
violated.‖  Totten, 92 U.S. at 107.  The Court confronted a similar situation in 
Tenet.  Weinberger thus reaffirms Totten, but nothing in Weinberger suggests 
that the Totten bar applies to cases other than those involving spy contracts. 
67. Tenet, 544 U.S. at 7-11. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 11. 
70. Id. at 9. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/23
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In the second category—the ―Totten cases‖—courts, 
trending more toward Totten, often treat the state secrets 
privilege more as a rule of justiciability.  The courts in these 
cases are quicker to dismiss based only on the Government‘s 
assertion that the very subject matter of the case is a state 
secret. 
This section discusses both categories in some detail in 
order to provide the background for assessing the shifts in the 
state secrets privilege in the post-9/11 cases. 
 
A. The Reynolds Cases 
 
The Reynolds cases tend to treat the state secrets privilege 
as a common law evidentiary privilege, following Reynolds 
itself.71  In other words, the courts in these cases consider state 
secrets claims on the evidence, usually during discovery, and 
determine whether the evidence contains state secrets.  If it 
does, the courts then determine whether and how to proceed 
without the privileged evidence.  These courts thus treat the 
state secrets privilege like any other evidentiary privilege. 
The characteristics of these cases include: treating the 
privilege as evidentiary, rather than constitutional; serious 
considerations of a plaintiff‘s need for the information; 
meaningful scrutiny of the Government‘s claim of privilege, 
often including in camera review of the material sought to be 
protected, not just a review of the supporting affidavit; and 
serious consideration of alternative non-privileged sources for 
the information.  These cases exhibit such characteristics even 
when the Government moves to dismiss, or for summary 
judgment on the pleadings, because, for example, the plaintiff 
cannot establish standing or a prima facie case without the 
privileged evidence. 
These characteristics are illustrated in a series of cases out 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit.  In Ellsberg v. Mitchell, the court ruled that 
the district court had properly protected certain evidence from 
 
71. See generally United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); In re 
Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139 (D.C. Cir. 2007); In re United States, 872 F.2d 472 
(D.C. Cir. 1989); Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Ellsberg v. 
Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Halkin v. Helms (Halkin II), 690 F.2d 
977 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Halkin v. Helms (Halkin I), 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
13
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discovery after it reviewed the underlying material and various 
affidavits supporting the Government‘s assertion of the 
privilege.72  But in so ruling, the court also offered its own 
reasons for close judicial examination of assertions of the 
privilege: 
 
The head of an executive department can 
appraise the public interest of secrecy as well (or 
perhaps in some cases better) than the judge, but 
his official habit and leaning tend to sway him 
toward a minimizing of the interest of the 
individual.  Under the normal administrative 
routine the question will come to him with 
recommendations from cautious subordinates 
against disclosure and in the press of business 
the chief is likely to approve the recommendation 
about such a seemingly minor matter without 
much independent consideration. . . . Thus, to 
ensure that the state secrets privilege is asserted 
no more frequently and sweepingly than 
necessary, it is essential that the courts continue 
critically to examine instances of its invocation.73 
 
Thus the court should closely examine an assertion of the state 
secrets privilege, even as it accords ―considerable deference‖74 
to the executive and judges only whether the Government has 
established a ―reasonable danger‖75 that disclosure will result 
in harm.  The court wrote that, in determining whether and 
how to review materials sought to be protected, it should 
consider both the litigant‘s need for the material76 and ―the 
government‘s allegations of danger to national security in the 
context of all the circumstances surrounding the case.‖77 
Both the district court and the D.C. Circuit closely 
scrutinized the Government‘s assertions of the state secrets 
privilege.  They both reviewed in camera the underlying 
 
72. Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 59. 
73. Id. at 58 (citations omitted). 
74. Id. 
75. Id. (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953)). 
76. Id. at 58. 
77. Id. at 59. 
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material regarding the defendant‘s electronic surveillance of 
the plaintiffs, as well as the affidavits supporting the claims of 
privilege.  The D.C. Circuit upheld the district court‘s decision 
with regard to most of the Government‘s assertions of the 
privilege.  But it overruled the district court on one key aspect: 
it closely examined the Government‘s assertions and ruled that 
the Government insufficiently justified—and thus the lower 
court improperly granted—protection of key evidence for the 
plaintiffs, i.e., the names of Attorneys General who authorized 
the surveillance.78 
Both courts also treated the privilege as an evidentiary 
privilege, not a constitutional principle that would mandate 
dismissal.  To be sure, this treatment squared with the 
procedural posture of the case: the Government asserted the 
privilege largely in the context of discovery, not as a basis to 
dismiss the case on the pleadings.79  Even so, the circuit court 
could not have been clearer that the privilege was categorically 
evidentiary.80  The court held that ―the uniform rule governing 
civil suits brought by private parties is that the effect of 
invocation of a state secrets privilege is simply to remove from 
the case the material in question.‖81  The Ellsberg court ruled 
that this general principle applied to the case; therefore, 
dismissal of any portion of the suit would be appropriate ―only 
if the plaintiffs were manifestly unable to make out a prima 
facie case without the requested information.‖82 
Ellsberg thus holds that where a plaintiff‘s need for the 
material is strong, courts should closely scrutinize assertions of 
executive privilege through in camera examinations of 
supporting affidavits, as well as the underlying material the 
 
78. Id. at 59-60.  The court went one step further in its scrutiny and 
ruled that, where the plaintiffs made a compelling showing of need for the 
information, ―the trial judge should insist . . . that the formal claim of 
privilege be made on the public record,‖ id. at 63 (emphasis added), as well as 
a public defense of the assertion of privilege, or else an explanation why such 
a public defense would endanger national security.  Id. at 63-64. 
79. Id. at 52-56. 
80. Id. at 65. 
81. Id.  The court wrote that this ―uniform rule‖ applied in all but one 
special situation: where the Government asserts the privilege against 
material in a plaintiff‘s possession in a case between two private litigants.  
Id. at 58 (citing Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 281 (4th 
Cir. 1980) (en banc) (per curiam)). 
82. Id. at 65. 
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party is seeking to protect.83  In cases of compelling need, 
courts should also require the Government to defend its claim 
of privilege publicly.84  Therefore, if the court grants the 
privilege, the case will move forward without the protected 
material.  Dismissal of any claim is only appropriate if the 
protected material is essential to the claim. 
The Ellsberg court articulated these principles in a case 
where the Government asserted the state secrets claim largely 
in discovery, but the D.C. Circuit has affirmed these principles 
in a line of cases where the Government moved for complete 
dismissal on the pleadings.85  As in Ellsberg, the courts in these 
cases treated the privilege as an evidentiary privilege and 
carefully examined the Government‘s claim of privilege.86  
Because these cases involved complete dismissal, the courts 
also looked carefully at alternative, non-privileged sources of 
information that would permit the plaintiffs‘ claims to go 
forward.87 
Thus, in Halkin v. Helms (―Halkin I‖), the court ruled on 
the Government‘s assertion of the state secrets privilege in 
response to the plaintiffs‘ claims that the National Security 
Agency (―NSA‖) conducted warrantless interceptions of their 
international wire and telephone communications in violation 
of their constitutional and statutory rights.88  The Government 
filed a motion to dismiss based upon the formal claim of the 
state secrets privilege by the Secretary of Defense.89  The 
Secretary argued that discovery or even a responsive pleading 
would necessarily disclose the identity of those targeted, the 
nature of the intercepted communications, and the methods of 
interception—all of which are state secrets.90 
The court ruled in favor of the Government and even 
granted the privilege with respect to one NSA program for 
 
83. Id. at 69. 
84. Id. at 63-64 & n.53. 
85. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139 (D.C. Cir. 2007); In re 
United States, 872 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815 
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Halkin I, 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
86. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 85. 
87. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 85. 
88. Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 11. 
89. Id. at 4. 
90. Id. at 8. 
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which the district court denied the privilege.91  In doing so, 
however, it carefully probed the Government‘s claim based on 
the plaintiffs‘ extraordinary need: the plaintiffs‘ case depended 
on the information in the evidence that the defense was 
seeking to protect.92  The court thus ruled that the district 
court properly examined in camera three government affidavits 
and the testimony of the NSA deputy director before ruling on 
the privilege.93  Moreover, it examined available non-privileged 
alternatives to the privileged evidence and, only after careful 
review, ruled that alternatives would not allow the plaintiffs to 
establish a prima facie case.94 
The court remanded the case, permitting it to go forward 
on other evidence and other claims.  When the case reached the 
D.C. Circuit again, in Halkin II, the Government claimed the 
privilege in discovery.95  But in Halkin II, the D.C. Circuit held 
that the trial judge appropriately upheld the privilege on the 
basis of two affidavits of the director of the CIA.96  After 
carefully reviewing the affidavits and exhaustively considering 
the plaintiffs‘ arguments (including arguments about specific 
measures the court should use to examine the Government‘s 
 
91. Id. at 10-11. 
92. Id. at 9.  The court wrote: 
 
In most cases [the Secretary‘s affidavit] would be sufficient 
to sustain the claim of privilege.  Here, however, plaintiffs‘ 
suit depends upon the discovery of this information.  
Because it is the showing of necessity that determines how 
deeply the court must probe to satisfy itself of the validity of 
the claim the court below examined the in camera affidavits 
and testimony.  We think this was proper.  Moreover, we 
have reviewed the in camera materials ourselves and they 
reinforce our conclusion from the open affidavits that the 
state secrets claim must be upheld. 
 
Id. (citation omitted). 
93. Id. at 7. 
94. Id. at 9.  The full D.C. Circuit denied en banc review.  Id. at 11.  Two 
judges, Judge Bazelon and Chief Judge Wright, were in favor of en banc 
review.  In a statement, written by Judge Bazelon and joined by Chief Judge 
Wright, they argued that the court did not go far enough in crediting the 
plaintiffs‘ ―weighty Fourth Amendment interests‖ and the extent to which 
one of the surveillance programs had previously been made public.  Id. at 11-
18 (Bazelon, J., statement as to why he voted for rehearing en banc). 
95. Halkin II, 690 F.2d 977, 989-90 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
96. Id. at 991. 
17
2010] THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE 795 
claim), the court ruled that it need go no further in scrutinizing 
the Government‘s claim of privilege.97  The court wrote that it 
was ―self-evident that the disclosures sought here pose[d] a 
‗reasonable danger‘ to the diplomatic and military interests of 
the United States.‖98  As a result, the court ruled that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing to establish their claim that they 
were targets of government surveillance.99 
The D.C. Circuit approached the state secrets privilege 
similarly in Molerio v. FBI.100  In Molerio, the plaintiff claimed 
that the FBI refused to hire him as a special agent because of 
his father‘s political activities—an alleged violation of his 
statutory and constitutional rights.101  After answering 
portions of the complaint and providing some discovery, the 
Government asserted the state secrets privilege and moved for 
complete dismissal, claiming that it could not litigate the case 
without revealing secret information.102 
In an opinion authored by then-Judge Antonin Scalia, the 
court first ruled that the Government had satisfied the 
procedural requirements of the state secrets privilege.103  The 
court specifically noted that the Government‘s motion to 
dismiss would be, and had been, treated as a motion for 
summary judgment.104  The court‘s ruling is more consistent 
with the notion that the state secrets privilege is an 
evidentiary privilege, not an absolute bar to litigation.  The 
court upheld the trial court‘s ruling that the state secrets 
privilege protected the Government‘s reasons for not hiring the 
plaintiff, based on an in camera review of affidavits of the 
acting attorney general and the assistant director in charge of 
the Intelligence Division.105  But before upholding summary 
judgment, the court conducted a detailed review of the 
alternative, non-privileged evidence that might allow the 
 
97. Id. at 991-97. 
98. Id. at 993. 
99. Id. at 998. 
100. 749 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
101. Id. at 818-19. 
102. Id. at 819. 
103. Id. at 821.  The procedural requirements were at issue because the 
plaintiff claimed that the acting attorney general did not review all the 
relevant underlying material, including his father‘s FBI file.  Id. 
104. Id. at 820. 
105. Id. at 822. 
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plaintiff to establish his case.106  The court ultimately ruled 
that the evidence for each claim was insufficient.107 
In In re United States, the Government moved for complete 
dismissal of a suit by a plaintiff claiming that FBI surveillance 
and political action programs caused injuries to her and her 
deceased spouse.108  Both the district court and the court of 
appeals, on mandamus review, rejected the claim and allowed 
the suit to go forward.109  The D.C. Circuit ―carefully reviewed‖ 
the Government‘s supporting affidavit and rejected the 
Government‘s claim of privilege, writing that ―[w]e share the 
district court‘s confidence that it can police the litigation so as 
not to compromise national security.‖110  The fact that the 
plaintiff already received much of the sought-after information 
through the Freedom of Information Act (―FOIA‖) bolstered the 
court‘s decision to allow the case to proceed, because the 
plaintiff possessed, through FOIA, an alternative, non-
privileged source of the information.111  The court noted that 
the Government‘s motion was extraordinary and explained that 
the ―[d]ismissal of a suit, and the consequent denial of a forum 
 
106. Id. at 822-25. 
107. Id.  In a passage indicative of the D.C. Circuit‘s balanced approach 
to the state secrets privilege, the court wrote: 
 
It seems to us, however, that the effect of our determination 
with regard to the state secrets privilege is to prevent this 
issue from proceeding.  As noted earlier, we honored the 
invocation of that privilege because we satisfied ourselves 
that the in camera affidavit set forth the genuine reason . . . 
[that it] could not be disclosed without risking impairment 
of the national security.  As a result of that necessary 
process, the court knows that the reason Daniel Molerio was 
not hired had nothing to do with [his father‘s] assertion of 
First Amendment rights.  Although there may be enough 
circumstantial evidence to permit a jury to come to that 
erroneous conclusion, it would be a mockery of justice for 
the court – knowing the erroneousness – to participate in 
that exercise. . . .  Here . . . we know that further activity in 
this case would involve an attempt, however well 
intentioned, to convince the jury of a falsehood. 
 
Id. at 825. 
108. 872 F.2d 472, 473-74 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
109. Id. at 474. 
110. Id. at 480. 
111. Id. at 478-79. 
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without giving the plaintiff her day in court [was] 
draconian.‖112  Once again, the court closely examined the 
Government‘s claim and treated state secrets as an evidentiary 
privilege. 
Most recently, the D.C. Circuit in In re Sealed Case upheld 
the Government‘s successful assertion of the state secrets 
privilege, but permitted the case to proceed on the basis of 
alternative, non-privileged evidence.113  An employee of the 
Drug Enforcement Agency (―DEA‖) brought a claim against a 
State Department official and a federal agent affiliated with 
the CIA for tapping and recording his telephone conversations 
in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.114  In response to 
the plaintiff‘s allegations, the Government prepared two 
inspector general reports.115  Subsequently, the Government 
moved to intervene and asserted the privilege with respect to 
portions of those reports.116  After reviewing both the 
supporting affidavits and the underlying reports, the district 
court upheld the privilege and dismissed the entire case.117  
The court cited ―three independent grounds: (1) The plaintiff 
cannot make out a prima facie case absent the protected 
material; (2) the state secrets privilege deprives the defendants 
of information required in their defense; and (3) the subject 
matter of the plaintiff‘s complaint is a state secret.‖118 
The D.C. Circuit reviewed the affidavits and reports and 
upheld the Government‘s claim of privilege.119  But it 
overturned the district court‘s dismissal as to one of the two 
defendants.120  In an analysis that sums up the D.C. Circuit‘s 
approach to state secrets, the court addressed each ground for 
dismissal separately.121 
First, the court ruled that even without the privileged 
portions of the reports the plaintiff may be able to establish his 
 
112. Id. at 477. 
113. 494 F.3d 139, 154 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
114. Id. at 141. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 142. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 144. 
120. Id. at 154. 
121. Id. at 144-54. 
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prima facie case based on the unprotected portions of the 
reports and other non-privileged evidence.122  Importantly, the 
court analyzed the alternative, non-privileged evidence and its 
potential effects on the plaintiff‘s claim in some detail.123  The 
court noted that the CIA director‘s affidavit itself suggested 
that the unprotected portions of the reports could be segregated 
without revealing information that would harm national 
security.124  Moreover, the plaintiff possessed declassified 
portions of a cable that quoted his telephone conversation, he 
had evidence of ―a suspicious entry into his apartment,‖125 and 
he could call government officers to testify as to non-privileged 
matters relevant to his claims.126  This evidence was indirect, to 
be sure, but the court ruled that it was sufficient to withstand 
the Government‘s motion to dismiss the entire case with 
respect to one of the two defendants.127 
Second, the court ruled that the Government‘s defense, 
which hinged on protected information, was insufficiently 
defined and too obscure to permit the court to dismiss the 
entire case.128  The court distinguished Molerio, in which the 
privileged material conclusively demonstrated to the court that 
the Government ―could not have committed the alleged acts,‖129 
and suggested that the Government‘s defense here was murky 
and uncertain.130  The court used language that underscored 
two characteristics of the D.C. Circuit‘s approach to state 
secrets—treating state secrets as an evidentiary privilege, and 
seriously considering the plaintiff‘s need for the information.  
After a careful examination of the Government‘s claims and its 
treatment of state secrets as an evidentiary privilege, the court 
wrote: 
 
Under this court‘s precedent, a claim of state 
secrets privilege results in ―no consequences save 
 
122. Id. at 145-48. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 146. 
126. Id. at 145-46. 
127. Id. at 148. 
128. Id. at 148-51. 
129. Id. at 149. 
130. Id. at 148-51. 
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those resulting from the loss of the evidence,‖ 
including ―no alteration of pertinent substantive 
or procedural rules.‖ . . .  Just as ―[i]t would be 
manifestly unfair to permit a presumption of 
[unconstitutional conduct] to run against‖ the 
defendant when the privilege is invoked . . . it 
would be manifestly unfair to a plaintiff to 
impose a presumption that the defendant has a 
valid defense that is obscured by the privilege.  
There is no support for such a presumption 
among the other evidentiary privileges because a 
presumption would invariably shift the burdens 
of proof, something the courts may not do under 
the auspices of privilege.131 
 
The court emphasized that ―[i]t bears remembering that the 
loss of evidence to the state secrets privilege is to be treated 
like the loss of evidence when ‗a witness ha[s] died.‘‖132 
Next, in language that underscores the D.C. Circuit‘s 
consideration of the plaintiff‘s interests, the court wrote: 
 
In suggesting that a defendant‘s interests require 
dismissing actions because of plausible but not 
demonstrably valid defenses, our colleague 
ignores how this would abridge the rights of 
plaintiffs and discounts how the fundamental 
rights of defendants are protected by dismissing 
cases when privilege obscures a valid defense 
that is likely to cause the trier of fact to reach an 
erroneous conclusion . . . or upon a legitimate 
claim of immunity.133 
 
Finally, the court declined to adopt the Government‘s 
position that ―the very subject matter of the action . . . [is] a 
matter of state secret,‖134 requiring dismissal on the complaint 
 
131. Id. at 149-50 (citations omitted). 
132. Id. at 151 (quoting Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 64 (D.C. Cir. 
1983)). 
133. Id. (citations omitted). 
134. Id. at 151 (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 
(1953)). 
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alone.135  The court distinguished Totten and Doe, limiting 
those cases to spy agreements and writing that this case 
involved no such secret agreement with the United States.136  
The court also recognized the significant interests of the 
plaintiff by quoting In re United States—specifically, that 
complete dismissal deprives the plaintiff of ―her day in court‖ 
and ―is indeed draconian.‖137  Finally, the court suggested that 
Reynolds provided no basis for complete dismissal and affirmed 
that case as supporting an evidentiary privilege, noting that 
―[i]n Reynolds itself, at the height of the Cold War, the 
Supreme Court remanded the FTCA [Federal Tort Claims Act] 
case to proceed without the privileged materials.‖138 
The court seemed to acknowledge that under different 
circumstances the Government‘s claim might be valid.  The 
court distinguished El-Masri,139 in which the Fourth Circuit 
dismissed the complaint upon the Government‘s claim that the 
very subject matter of the litigation was a state secret.140  The 
D.C. Circuit Court wrote that El-Masri dealt with the legality 
of a secret government program.141  Such a program is far 
different than the declassified evidence in In re Sealed Case 
that might form the basis of the plaintiff‘s prima facie case.  By 
implication, if In re Sealed Case involved a secret government 
program like the program in El-Masri, the court might well 
have dismissed the complaint based on the secrecy of the very 
subject matter of the suit.  Supporting this conclusion, the 
court, in dicta, wrote that ―[i]f the district court determines 
 
135. Id. at 151-54. 
136. Id. at 151. 
137. Id. at 151 (quoting In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 
1989)). 
138. Id. 
139. 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 
2007). 
140. In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 152-53.  The court also distinguished 
Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1985) and 
Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc) 
(per curiam).  In those cases, however, the Fourth Circuit treated state 
secrets as an evidentiary privilege, similar to the approaches in Halkin I and 
Halkin II.  Fitzgerald and Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. did not involve the same 
type of sweeping categorical claim that the Government made in In re Sealed 
Case.  Thus the court‘s distinction between those cases and In re Sealed Case 
did not provide any insight into whether the D.C. Circuit might recognize the 
Government‘s claim in another case. 
141. In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 152-53. 
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that the subject matter of a case is so sensitive that there is no 
way it can be litigated without risking national secrets, then 
the case must be dismissed.‖142 
But we must read this dictum and the court‘s cursory 
treatment of El-Masri alongside its earlier language on Totten, 
Reynolds, and complete dismissals of cases involving state 
secrets.  Taken together, within the larger context of the 
opinion, the court cannot be understood as endorsing the 
broader claim that a case might be dismissed because its very 
subject matter is a state secret.  In the D.C. Circuit and the 
Reynolds cases, unlike the Totten cases, this question is, at 
most, open. 
For all these reasons, the Reynolds cases reject the 
Government‘s motion to dismiss on the basis of the ―very 
subject matter of [the] action,‖143 and allow the case to proceed 
on alternative, non-privileged evidence. 
Thus the Reynolds cases treat the state secrets doctrine as 
a common law evidentiary privilege.  The courts in these cases 
carefully consider the plaintiff‘s need for the evidence, they 
determine how deeply to probe into the Government‘s claim of 
privilege, and they carefully determine whether and how to 
proceed in the case without any privileged evidence.  They 
exhibit these characteristics even when dismissing an action 
because the privilege prevents a plaintiff from establishing a 
prima facie case.  In short, they treat the state secrets privilege 
as they would treat any other evidentiary privilege. 
For the courts in the Totten line of cases, the state secrets 
privilege is much more. 
 
B. The Totten Cases 
 
In contrast to the Reynolds cases, the Totten cases tend to 
treat the state secrets privilege more like a justiciability 
doctrine.144  In other words, the courts in the Totten cases are 
 
142. Id. at 153. 
143. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953). 
144. See generally Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875); Sterling 
v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2005); Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159 (9th 
Cir. 1998); Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 1995); Bareford v. 
Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1992), vacated in part, No. 91-
2432, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 25805 (5th Cir. Oct. 14, 1992); Fitzgerald v. 
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quicker to dismiss a case because its very subject matter is a 
state secret.  This approach prevents a plaintiff from 
establishing a case on other, non-privileged grounds.  It means 
that whole categories of cases are inappropriate for judicial 
review. 
The characteristics of these cases include little or no 
consideration of the plaintiff‘s need for the evidence; great 
deference to the Government in its assertion of the privilege; 
little consideration of whether and how to proceed without 
privileged evidence; and, of course, complete dismissal anytime 
the very subject matter of the case is a state secret. 
Thus in Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, an en banc 
Fourth Circuit reversed a three-judge panel of the Fourth 
Circuit and upheld the district court‘s summary dismissal of 
the plaintiff‘s claims upon the Government‘s assertion of the 
state secrets privilege.145  In that case, the plaintiff, a defense 
contractor, alleged that a Navy employee wrongfully interfered 
with its prospective contract with the Navy.146  In an opinion 
characteristic of the D.C. Circuit‘s approach to state secrets, a 
three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded 
the district court‘s dismissal.147  The appellate court held that 
dismissal was not justified even if the very subject matter of 
the suit were a state secret or when the state secrets doctrine 
worked to deprive the defendant of a valid defense.148  It also 
held that the plaintiff could attempt to use alternative, non-
privileged evidence to establish its claim.149 
The full Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, in a per curiam 
opinion running all of five paragraphs with no case citations, 
affirmed the district court‘s dismissal.150  After examining the 
affidavit of the Secretary of the Navy, the court wrote that ―any 
attempt on the part of the plaintiff to establish a prima facie 
case would so threaten disclosure of state secrets that the 
overriding interest of the United States and the preservation of 
 
Penthouse Int‘l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1985); Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. 
v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (per curiam). 
145. Farnsworth Cannon, Inc., 635 F.2d at 281. 
146. Id. at 268-70. 
147. Id. at 276. 
148. Id. at 269-73. 
149. Id. at 273-75. 
150. Id. at 281. 
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its state secrets precludes any further attempt to pursue this 
litigation.‖151  The court apparently deferred completely to the 
Government, without a hint of consideration of alternative, 
non-privileged evidence or the plaintiff‘s interest in the case.152  
Four judges, including two on the original panel, dissented.153 
Citing Farnsworth Cannon, the Fourth Circuit, in 
Fitzgerald v. Penthouse International, Ltd., again affirmed a 
district court‘s dismissal of a plaintiff‘s claim based on the 
Government‘s assertion of the state secrets privilege.154  In 
Fitzgerald, the plaintiff claimed that a publisher libelously 
charged the plaintiff with espionage, suggesting that the 
plaintiff attempted to profit from his work on the Government‘s 
secret program involving the use of animals for military and 
intelligence purposes.155  When the plaintiff sought to call a 
witness that would testify that the plaintiff revealed only 
unclassified information about the program, the Government 
intervened, asserted the state secrets privilege, and moved to 
dismiss the case.156  In support of its claim, the Government 
produced an affidavit from the Secretary of the Navy, which 
explained that ―public disclosure of the classified information 
involved in this program could reasonably be expected to cause 
grave damage to the national security,‖ and that ―it was 
‗probable that classified information relating to the potential 
military uses of marine mammals [would] be called for, either 
directly or by a process of elimination,‘ if the case proceeded to 
trial.‖157 
The court upheld the privilege, and the district court‘s 
dismissal, because ―the very subject of this litigation [was] 
itself a state secret.‖158  It considered neither alternative, non-
privileged evidence that the plaintiff might use to establish his 
claim nor the plaintiff‘s interest in the case.  And it considered 
 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Judge Phillips and Judge Murnaghan, both of whom sat on the 
original panel, dissented in separate opinions.  Id. at 281-82 (Phillips, J., 
dissenting); id. at 282-83 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).  Judges Winter and 
Ervin joined Judge Phillips‘s dissent.  Id. at 281-82 (Phillips, J., dissenting). 
154. 776 F.2d 1236, 1244 (4th Cir. 1985). 
155. Id. at 1237. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 1242-43. 
158. Id. at 1243. 
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no method by which the district court might protect privileged 
evidence while allowing the case to proceed.  In short, the court 
apparently deferred completely to the Secretary‘s claims 
regarding the inability to proceed without disclosing secret 
information.159  The court concluded by aligning the case with 
Farnsworth Cannon and Totten, but cited no authority for this 
novel alignment.  Instead, the court declared that ―Totten, 
Farnsworth Cannon and this case all fall within that narrow 
category due to the centrality of the privileged material to the 
very question upon which a decision must be rendered.‖160 
In Bareford v. General Dynamics Corp., plaintiffs sued a 
defense contractor, alleging that its defective weapons system 
caused deaths and injuries of sailors in a missile attack.161  The 
Federal Government intervened and alleged that the state 
secrets privilege protected evidence critical to the plaintiffs‘ 
case and that the very subject of the action was a state 
secret.162  The Government moved to dismiss the case on the 
pleadings.163  After an in camera examination of the Navy‘s 
official investigation and a supporting affidavit by an admiral, 
the district court dismissed the case.164 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court‘s dismissal, 
holding that the plaintiffs would be unable to prove their case 
without the protected information and that the very subject 
matter of the case was a state secret.165  The court held that 
while the plaintiffs produced voluminous alternative, non-
privileged evidence, it was insufficient to establish their 
 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 1244. 
161. 973 F.2d 1138, 1140 (5th Cir. 1992), vacated in part, No. 91-2432, 
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 25805 (5th Cir. Oct. 14, 1992).  The Bareford court 
noted that Zuckerbraun v. General Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 
1991) involved the same basic facts.  Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1142 (stating that 
the plaintiff‘s alternative evidence in Bareford is more than the ―dockside 
rumor‖ in Zuckerbraun).  The Second Circuit in Zuckerbraun used an 
approach very much like the Fifth Circuit‘s approach in Bareford, except that 
the Second Circuit was somewhat more cursory in its analysis, in part 
because the plaintiffs in Zuckerbraun did not come forward with alternative, 
non-privileged evidence to establish their claims.  See generally Zuckerbraun 
v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1991). 
162. Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1140, 1145. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 1145. 
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claim.166  The court wrote, 
 
Bareford has come forward with substantial 
evidence from which a judge or jury might find 
problems, or even wrongdoing, by General 
Dynamics in its production and testing of the 
Phalanx system.  That alone will not establish a 
prima facie case.  Its claim of manufacturing and 
design defects requires proof of what the Phalanx 
system was intended to do and the ways in which 
it fails to accomplish these goals.  This question 
cannot be resolved without access to detailed 
data regarding ―the design, manufacture, 
performance, functional characteristics, and 
testing of these systems.‖ . . . Such an analysis of 
the capabilities of an advanced Navy frigate‘s 
defensive systems is the type of judicial 
disclosure of state secrets the doctrine blocks.167 
 
But even if the additional evidence might establish their claim, 
the court ruled that ―any further attempt by the plaintiffs to 
establish a prima facie case would threaten disclosure of 
important state secrets.‖168  Moreover, even alternative, non-
privileged evidence would require acknowledgment by the 
Government, thus revealing a state secret.169  In other words, 
any litigation of the matter would reveal a state secret; or, 
stated differently, the very subject matter of the case was a 
state secret.170  The court affirmed the district court‘s dismissal 
and declined to permit the case to go forward. 
The Fifth Circuit in Bareford gave only cursory 
consideration to the plaintiffs‘ alternative, non-privileged 
evidence as an alternative basis for its claims.  Moreover, it did 
not even consider the plaintiffs‘ significant interests in 
 
166. Id. at 1141. 
167. Id. at 1142 (citation omitted). 
168. Id. at 1143. 
169. Id. at 1144. 
170. Id. at 1143.  The Bareford court wrote that ―[t]he state secret 
doctrine justifies dismissal when privileged material is central ‗to the very 
question upon which a decision must be rendered.‘‖  Id. (quoting Fitzgerald v. 
Penthouse Int‘l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1244 (4th Cir. 1985)). 
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pursuing the case.  Instead, the court disregarded the 
plaintiffs‘ interests because the Government properly invoked 
the privilege.171  Finally, the court ruled that the privilege 
completely barred further litigation, in part because the very 
subject matter of the action was a state secret.172 
In Black v. United States, the Eighth Circuit similarly 
dismissed a plaintiff‘s complaint on the pleadings based on the 
Government‘s assertion of the state secrets privilege.173  In that 
case, the plaintiff, an electrical engineer who worked on 
military projects for various defense contractors, alleged that 
the Government engaged in a ―campaign of harassment and 
psychological attacks‖ against him in violation of his 
constitutional rights and the Federal Tort Claims Act.174  The 
Government asserted the state secrets privilege and moved to 
dismiss the case on the amended complaint.175  The district 
reviewed in camera two supporting government declarations 
and granted the Government‘s motion, dismissing the case.176 
The Eighth Circuit upheld the dismissal, ruling that the 
plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case and that 
continued litigation would risk revealing the privileged 
 
171. Compare Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics, Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1144 
(5th Cir. 1992), vacated in part, No. 91-2432, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 25805 
(5th Cir. Oct. 14, 1992) (―Plaintiffs argue that dismissal of their case was an 
overly harsh remedy for the potential security risk posed by the trial of this 
case.  Dismissal is a harsh sanction.  But the results are harsh in either 
direction and the state secret doctrine finds the greater public good—
ultimately the less harsh remedy—to be dismissal.‖) with In re United States, 
872 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (―Dismissal of a suit, and the consequent 
denial of a forum without giving the plaintiff her day in court, however, is 
indeed draconian.‖). 
 The Bareford approach seems to conflate or to confuse the two steps in 
Reynolds.  As we have seen, Reynolds first requires the court to use the 
plaintiff‘s interest to calibrate the depth of its probe into the Government‘s 
assertion of the privilege.  Next, it requires the court to determine whether 
and how to proceed with the case in light of the assertion of privilege.  The 
first step requires consideration of the plaintiff‘s interest, the second step 
does not.  The court in Bareford, however, neglects the plaintiffs‘ interests, 
seemingly because it held that the Government appropriately invoked the 
privilege. 
172. Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1144. 
173. 62 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 1995). 
174. Id. at 1116-17. 
175. Id. at 1117. 
176. Id. 
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information.177  Like the Fifth Circuit in Bareford, and in sharp 
contrast to the D.C. Circuit in the similar case In re Sealed 
Case, the Eighth Circuit gave very little consideration to any 
alternative, non-privileged evidence that might support the 
plaintiff‘s claim.  It gave no consideration to the plaintiff‘s 
interest in the case and ruled that the privilege completely 
barred further litigation of the matter, coming very close to 
holding that the very subject matter of the case was a state 
secret.178 
The Ninth Circuit similarly upheld the state secrets 
privilege in Kasza v. Browner, a case in which a plaintiff 
challenged Air Force compliance with the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act.179  The Government asserted 
the state secrets privilege in response to plaintiff‘s discovery 
requests and moved for summary judgment on the ground that 
the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case.180  After 
reviewing supporting affidavits and documents in camera, the 
district court concluded that the plaintiff could not establish 
the claims and granted summary judgment.181 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed for two independent reasons: 
(1) because the privilege prevented the plaintiff from 
establishing a prima facie case, and (2) because the very 
subject matter of the plaintiff‘s suit was a state secret.182  Like 
the Fourth Circuit in Farnsworth Cannon and Fitzgerald, the 
Ninth Circuit in Kasza provided very little analysis for this 
latter conclusion, although it did analyze other aspects of the 
Government‘s claim.  It merely cited Reynolds, Totten, Weston 
v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.,183 and Farnsworth Cannon in 
support of its conclusion that the very subject matter of the 
litigation was a state secret and required dismissal.184  Because 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on this basis, it 
declined to consider how the plaintiff might proceed on other, 
 
177. Id. at 1118. 
178. Id. at 1119 (―The information covered by the privilege is at the core 
of Black‘s claims, and we are satisfied that the litigation cannot be tailored to 
accommodate the loss of the privileged information.‖). 
179. 133 F.3d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 1998). 
180. Id. at 1163. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 1170. 
183. 881 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1989). 
184. Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1165-67, 1170. 
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non-privileged, evidence.185 
In Tenenbaum v. Simonini, the Sixth Circuit upheld 
summary judgment against a plaintiff who alleged that various 
federal employees and the United States conducted a criminal 
espionage investigation against him solely because he was 
Jewish.186  After reviewing the Government‘s supporting 
materials, the court ruled that the state secrets privilege 
applied and completely barred further litigation.187  Moreover, 
the court ruled that the Government could not defend itself 
without revealing protected information.188  Just like the Fifth 
Circuit in Bareford and the Eighth Circuit in Black, the Sixth 
Circuit here gave no consideration to alternative, non-
privileged evidence; it gave no consideration to the plaintiffs‘ 
interest in the case; and it dismissed the case on summary 
judgment because its very subject matter was a state secret.189 
Finally, the Fourth Circuit in Sterling v. Tenet affirmed 
the district court‘s dismissal of a plaintiff‘s claim that the CIA 
discriminated against him because of his race.190  Like the 
Ninth Circuit in Kasza, the Fourth Circuit held that the state 
secrets privilege prevented the plaintiff from establishing a 
prima facie case and that the very subject of the case was a 
state secret.191  As to the latter holding, the Fourth Circuit 
offered little analysis, simply resting its holding on Fitzgerald, 
Farnsworth Cannon, and DTM Research, L.L.C v. AT&T 
Corp.192 
These Totten cases are thus characterized by little to no 
consideration of the plaintiff‘s need for the information, great 
judicial deference to executive claims of state secrets, and scant 
consideration of whether or how a case might proceed in the 
 
185. Id. at 1170. 
186. 372 F.3d 776, 776 (6th Cir. 2004). 
187. Id. at 777-78. 
188. Id. at 777. 
189. There appears to be no particular reason that the district court 
granted summary judgment, and not a motion to dismiss, in this case.  We 
can, therefore, make no inferences about the court‘s treatment of the state 
secrets doctrine based on its upholding the district court on summary 
judgment and not on a motion to dismiss. 
190. 416 F.3d 338, 341 (4th Cir. 2005). 
191. Id. at 346-47, 348. 
192. Id. at 347-48 (citing, inter alia, DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T 
Corp., 245 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2001)). 
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absence of privileged evidence.  But most notably, these cases 
are characterized by complete dismissals because the very 
subject matter of the suits involved state secrets. 
The dismissals in the Totten cases are significantly 
different than the dismissals in the Reynolds cases.  In the 
Reynolds cases, the courts maintain at least the theoretical 
possibility that a plaintiff‘s case might move forward based on 
alternative, non-privileged evidence.  The courts in those cases 
often remanded the case in order to determine whether 
sufficient non-privileged evidence existed to allow the case to 
proceed.  This approach is consistent with the approach courts 
use for any evidentiary privilege and is in perfect harmony 
with Reynolds itself. 
The courts in the Totten cases, however, thwarted the 
possibility of proceeding on alternative evidence by dismissing 
the entire case because its very subject matter was a state 
secret.  As compared to the Reynolds cases, these cases scarcely 
considered the plaintiff‘s need for the evidence, granted 
extraordinary deference to the executive branch, and declined 
to seriously consider methods of allowing the cases to proceed.  
As discussed below, the Government‘s position on the state 
secrets privilege in the post-9/11 cases builds on these 
characteristics of the Totten cases. 
 
III.  The Post-9/11 Cases 
 
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the Government‘s position 
on the state secrets privilege builds upon the characteristics of 
the Totten cases and attempts to give the privilege expanded 
and very troubling dimensions.  Particularly, the Government 
has argued that the courts should accord the executive the 
utmost deference in its assertions of the state secrets privilege; 
that courts should neglect plaintiffs‘ interests; and that courts 
should not consider alternative, non-privileged evidence or 
judicial controls to permit the lawsuits to proceed without 
privileged material, even when information on the programs 
was widely available, often from the Government itself.  For 
these reasons, and based on the Totten cases discussed above, 
the Government has argued that the courts should dismiss 
these cases, because their very subject matter involves a state 
secret. 
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But the Government in the post-9/11 cases has taken its 
claim one dangerous step further.  Unlike previous cases, the 
Government in the post-9/11 cases has argued that the state 
secrets privilege is a constitutional doctrine—that it has roots 
in the President‘s Article II powers.  This unprecedented claim 
has garnered one important victory: the Fourth Circuit decision 
in El-Masri v. United States.  As discussed below, this position 
represents a breathtaking expansion of the state secrets 
privilege.  It means that the state secrets privilege, as a 
constitutional doctrine, trumps any consideration of a 
plaintiff‘s interests or need for evidence and crowds out any 
meaningful role for courts.  Taken along with its other 
positions, this extraordinary claim means that the Government 
could move for dismissal on the bare assertion that the very 
subject of a suit is a state secret, effectively evading any 
judicial oversight of the claim. 
The Government‘s position on the state secrets privilege in 
the post-9/11 cases is characterized by a neglect of any 
plaintiff‘s interest or need for evidence, extraordinary deference 
to the Government, no consideration of whether or how cases 
might proceed without privileged evidence, and complete 
dismissal whenever the Government asserts that the very 
subject matter of a case is a state secret–all characteristics of 
the Totten cases.  But the Government‘s position is intensified 
in the post-9/11 cases, because of the Government‘s 
extraordinary claim that the state secrets privilege is a 
constitutional doctrine. 
This section examines some of the cases in two closely 
guarded and highly controversial programs in the post-9/11 
era—the Terrorist Surveillance Program and the extraordinary 
rendition program. 
 
A. The Terrorist Surveillance Program 
 
The Government has moved to dismiss cases challenging 
the NSA‘s Terrorist Surveillance Program (―TSP‖) because the 
very subject matter of the suits involved a state secret.  The 
TSP included data mining and warrantless interception of 
telephone and electronic communications where one party was 
located outside the United States and was identified by the 
33
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NSA as connected to a terrorist organization.193  Plaintiffs 
challenged the TSP in several cases as a violation of their First 
and Fourth Amendment rights and the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (―FISA‖).194 
Building on the characteristics of the Totten cases, the 
Government moved to dismiss an early case, American Civil 
Liberties Union v. National Security Agency, on the grounds 
that the state secrets privilege protected information necessary 
for the plaintiffs to establish standing, that the plaintiffs‘ 
claims could not be proven or defended without information 
protected by state secrets, and that the very subject matter of 
the lawsuit, the TSP, was a state secret.195  The Government 
argued that the court‘s review is highly deferential196 and that 
the plaintiff‘s interest plays no part in the court‘s evaluation of 
the Government‘s assertion.197 
The Government made nearly identical arguments in other 
cases challenging the TSP, including Hepting v. AT&T Corp., a 
case against a private telecommunications company for its role 
in the TSP program,198 and Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation v. 
Bush, a case against government officials.199 
 
193. See generally Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 986-87 
(N.D. Cal. 2006) (collecting publicly available materials on the TSP and 
describing the program in greater detail). 
194. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 
92 Stat. 1783. 
195. 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758-59 (E.D. Mich. 2006), rev’d, 493 F.3d 644 
(6th Cir. 2007). 
196. Government‘s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
the United States‘ Assertion of the Military and State Secrets Privilege; 
Defendants‘ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary 
Judgment; and Defendants‘ Motion to Stay Consideration of Plaintiffs‘ 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat‘l Sec. 
Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 06-CV-10204) (―Aside 
from ensuring that the privilege has been properly invoked as a procedural 
matter, the sole determination for the court is whether, under the particular 
circumstances of the case, there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the 
evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national 
security, should not be divulged.‖) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
197. Id. (―Thus, in assessing whether to uphold a claim of privilege, the 
court does not balance the respective needs of the parties for the 
information.‖). 
198. 439 F. Supp. 2d at 978. 
199. 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1218-19 (D. Or. 2006), rev’d, 507 F.3d 1190 
(9th Cir. 2007). 
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The courts in these cases largely rejected the Government‘s 
most sweeping claims, even as they sometimes ruled in the 
Government‘s favor.  Thus, the Sixth Circuit in American Civil 
Liberties Union v. National Security Agency held that without 
protected evidence the plaintiffs could not establish that they 
were or would be targets of the TSP program.200  The court, 
therefore, ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing.201  
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit ruled in Al-Haramain Islamic 
Foundation, Inc. v. Bush, that evidence necessary for the 
plaintiff‘s standing was protected by the state secrets 
privilege.202  The district court in Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 
however, denied the Government‘s assertion of the state secrets 
privilege.203  The court ruled that public disclosures by the 
Government and defendant precluded the Government‘s claim 
that the very subject matter of the suit was a state secret.204  
And, citing Halkin II, the court declined to decide the 
Government‘s other claims—that the Government‘s state 
secrets assertion would prevent the plaintiff from establishing 
a prima facie case or for AT&T to defend the claim—until the 
case proceeded to discovery.205 
In these cases, the Government pushed the boundaries of 
the Totten cases, arguing that the courts should defer to the 
executive‘s assertion of state secrets, that the courts should 
neglect the plaintiffs‘ interests, and that the courts should 
dismiss cases based only on the complaints whenever the 
Government asserts the state secrets privilege.  The courts 
largely rejected these sweeping claims, issuing rulings that 
looked more like the Reynolds cases. 
The Government pushed harder—and achieved greater 
success—in the extraordinary rendition cases. 
 
B. The Extraordinary Rendition Program 
 
The Government has similarly moved to dismiss cases 
challenging its extraordinary rendition program based on the 
 
200. 493 F.3d at 659-87. 
201. Id. at 687. 
202. 507 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007). 
203. 439 F. Supp. 2d at 998-99. 
204. Id. at 994. 
205. Id. at 994-95 (citing Halkin II, 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). 
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very subject matter of the suits.  The Government‘s 
extraordinary rendition program involves the secret 
transportation and detention outside the United States of 
individuals suspected of involvement in terrorist activities.  
The Government conducted extraordinary renditions in order 
to allow interrogators to question these individuals using 
methods that were illegal under U.S. and international laws.206 
In El-Masri v. United States, the Government moved to 
dismiss the plaintiff‘s complaint on the basis that the very 
subject matter of the suit was a state secret.207  The plaintiff in 
that case claimed that the Government and government 
officials violated international law and his constitutional rights 
in conducting the extraordinary rendition.  The Government, 
employing arguments very similar to those in the TSP cases, 
argued that neither the plaintiff nor defendant could establish 
their positions without resorting to privileged information and 
that the very subject matter of the suit was a state secret.208 
But the Government also added a significant new 
argument.  The Government in El-Masri argued that the state 
secrets privilege enjoyed constitutional status209—that it was 
rooted in the President‘s Article II powers as the ―sole organ of 
the federal government in the field of international 
relations.‖210  ―It is the means by which the Executive Branch 
exercises its critical constitutional responsibility to protect 
secrets of state in the national interest.‖211  The Government, of 
course, could cite no case directly on point, as no court had 
previously held that the state secrets privilege enjoyed 
constitutional status.  Instead, the Government argued that 
the state secrets privilege was essential to its conduct of foreign 
 
206. See generally Leila Nadya Sadat, Enemy Combatants After Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld: Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and Other Nightmares from 
the War on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200 (2007). 
207. El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 535 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d 
sub. nom., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007). 
208. Id. 
209. Brief of the Appellee at 8, El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 
(4th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1667).  The Government argued that ―the Supreme 
Court has explained that the state secrets privilege is rooted in, and is an 
aspect of, the powers granted to the President by Article II of the 
Constitution.‖  Id. (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)). 
210. Id. (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 
304, 320 (1936)). 
211. Id. 
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/23
814 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
affairs, over which, it argued, it had plenary authority.212 
According to the Government, this constitutional basis for 
the state secrets privilege meant that it could assert the 
privilege unilaterally, with no judicial review.213  The 
Government wrote, ―[t]he law is clear that the decision to 
invoke the state secrets privilege constitutes the exercise of 
duties uniquely confided by the Constitution to the Executive 
Branch in order to safeguard the nation and to conduct the 
foreign relations of the United States.‖214  Moreover, the 
Government argued that the constitutional basis for the 
privilege overshadowed any interest the plaintiff may have in 
the litigation, reducing the plaintiff‘s interest to a nullity.215  In 
short, according to the Government, this constitutional basis 
for the state secrets privilege crowded out the judiciary‘s role in 
policing the privilege and the plaintiff‘s interest in the 
litigation.  The new claim thus offered firmer footing for 
extreme judicial deference and minimal concern for plaintiffs‘ 
interests—characteristics of the Totten cases—and expanded 
those principles into categorical constitutional rules.  According 
to the Government, the President‘s power to assert the state 
secrets privilege, grounded in Article II, meant that the 
President could assert the privilege without review of the 
judiciary and without consideration of plaintiffs‘ interests.216 
Taken together with the Government‘s argument that the 
 
212. Id. at 8-20. 
213. Id. at 5; see also id. at 14 (―Thus, the state secrets privilege has a 
constitutional foundation, is interposed as a matter of policy by the Executive 
Branch in order to further important foreign policy and national security 
concerns, is absolute when properly invoked, and can be asserted at any point 
in litigation when the privilege is needed in order to protect state secrets 
from disclosure, either purposeful or inadvertent.‖); id. at 16 (―Because the 
decision to assert the privilege for secrets of state involves a policy 
determination on a matter constitutionally committed to the Executive 
Branch, the scope of the inquiry undertaken by the Judicial Branch when the 
claim is interposed is very limited.‖). 
214. Id. at 5. 
215. Id. at 10-11 (―Because of its constitutional underpinning, ‗the 
privilege to protect state secrets must head the list‘ of the various 
governmental privileges recognized in our courts. . . . Thus, in evaluating a 
claim of state secrets privilege, the presiding court does not balance the 
interests of the United States in protecting its secrets against the interests of 
the litigant in gaining access to the information, for ‗[t]hat balance has 
already been struck.‘‖) (citations omitted). 
216. Id. at 8-9. 
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state secrets privilege required dismissal anytime the very 
subject matter of the suit involved state secrets, the 
Government‘s constitutional claim meant that it could shut 
down any lawsuit merely by asserting that its very subject 
matter was a state secret.217 
The Fourth Circuit adopted the Government‘s positions.218  
In an opinion laden with separation-of-powers considerations, 
most tilting toward judicial deference in the face of the 
executive‘s assertion of the state secrets privilege, the court 
upheld the district court‘s dismissal.219  The court ruled that 
the state secrets privilege prevented both the plaintiff and the 
defendants from establishing their positions,220 and that the 
very subject matter of the case was a state secret.221  In 
comparison to the Reynolds cases and the Totten cases 
described above, the court exhibited great deference to the 
Government and barely considered the plaintiff‘s interests.222  
 
217. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. (Mohamed II), 563 
F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir.), amended and superseded by 579 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 
2009), petition for reh’g en banc granted by 586 F.3d 1108 (―According to the 
Government‘s theory, the Judiciary should effectively cordon off all secret 
government actions from judicial scrutiny, immunizing the CIA and its 
partners from the demands and limits of the law.‖). 
218. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007).  The 
Government nearly won a second important case on this point.  As this 
Article was being edited, the en banc Second Circuit discussed the state 
secrets privilege in both constitutional and evidentiary terms in an 
extraordinary rendition case.  Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 574-75, 581 
n.14 (2d Cir. 2009).  The court seemed torn between a state secrets privilege 
rooted in separation-of-powers concerns and a state secrets privilege as a 
common law evidentiary privilege.  Id. at 581 n.14 (―[T]he state secrets 
privilege is often performed witness-by-witness; question-by-question; page-
by-page; paragraph-by-paragraph—and can take years. . . . In any event, the 
state secrets doctrine has roots in separation of powers principles, and is not 
itself devoid of constitutional implications.‖) (citing Dep‘t of Navy v. Egan, 
484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 303 (4th 
Cir. 2007)).  But the court expressly declined to rule on the state secrets 
privilege, Arar, 585 F.3d at 567, and the plaintiff did not press the issue in 
his petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.  Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at i, Arar v. Ashcroft, 2010 WL 500089 (Feb. 1, 2010) (No. 09-923). 
219. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 313. 
220. Id. at 308-10. 
221. Id. at 310-11. 
222. Id. at 308-10.  Judicial deference in El-Masri is perhaps best 
illustrated by the court‘s acceptance of the Government‘s claim that even the 
vast amount of non-privileged public information on the extraordinary 
rendition program, some of it produced by the Government itself, provided an 
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Most significantly, the court affirmed the Government‘s 
position that the state secrets privilege enjoys constitutional 
status: 
 
Although the state secrets privilege was 
developed at common law, it performs a function 
of constitutional significance, because it allows 
the executive branch to protect information 
whose secrecy is necessary to its military and 
foreign-affairs responsibilities. . . .  Significantly, 
the Executive‘s constitutional authority is at its 
broadest in the realm of military and foreign 
affairs.  The Court accordingly has indicated that 
the judiciary‘s role as a check on presidential 
action in foreign affairs is limited. . . .  Moreover, 
both the Supreme Court and this Court have 
recognized that the Executive‘s constitutional 
mandate encompasses the authority to protect 
national security information. . . .  The state 
secrets privilege that the United States has 
interposed in this civil proceeding thus has a 
firm foundation in the Constitution, in addition 
to its basis in the common law of evidence.223 
 
Armed with the El-Masri case, the Government made 
substantially the same arguments in a Ninth Circuit case.  In 
Mohamed v. Jeppesen, the plaintiffs again challenged the 
Government‘s extraordinary rendition program.224  Citing and 
quoting El-Masri liberally throughout its motion to dismiss and 
appellate brief, the Government argued that the state secrets 
 
insufficient basis upon which the plaintiff could prove his case.  See id. 
223. Id. at 303-04 (citations omitted). 
224. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. (Mohamed I), 539 F. Supp. 2d 
1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008), rev’d, 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009), amended and 
superseded by 579 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), petition for reh’g en banc granted 
by 586 F.3d 1108.  These arguments were not unique to the Bush 
administration.  The Government‘s attorney affirmed at oral argument, after 
President Obama took office, that the new administration vetted and 
approved these same arguments.  Audio file: Oral argument in Mohamed v. 
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009), available at http:// 
www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_subpage.php?pk_id=0000002777. 
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privilege was based on the President‘s Article II powers,225 the 
courts should review the Government‘s assertion with great 
deference,226 the plaintiff‘s interest is immaterial,227 and the 
court should dismiss the case because the very subject matter 
of the action involved a state secret.228 
The district court dismissed the case because the very 
subject matter of the action was a state secret,229 but a three-
judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed.230  The panel 
disentangled the Totten bar and the Reynolds privilege and 
ruled that neither could be so stretched as to support the 
Government‘s position in the case.231  The panel also reaffirmed 
that the Reynolds privilege was an evidentiary privilege, not a 
constitutional doctrine,232 and that any separation-of-powers 
considerations cut in favor of, not against, judicial review of the 
Government‘s assertion of the state secrets privilege.233  The 
panel affirmed that the courts have an active role in evaluating 
the executive‘s assertion of the privilege,234 and that the 
 
225. Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for 
Summary Judgment by the United States of America at 6, Mohamed I, 539 F. 
Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 07-02798); Redacted, Unclassified Brief 
for Intervenor-Appellee the United States at 12, Mohamed II, 563 F.3d 992 
(9th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-15693). 
226. Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for 
Summary Judgment by the United States of America at 7-9, Mohamed I, 539 
F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 07-02798); Redacted, Unclassified 
Brief for Intervenor-Appellee the United States at 12-13, Mohamed II, 563 
F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-15693). 
227. Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for 
Summary Judgment by the United States of America at 6-7, Mohamed I, 539 
F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 07-02798); Redacted, Unclassified 
Brief for Intervenor-Appellee the United States at 13, Mohamed II, 563 F.3d 
992 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-15693). 
228. Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for 
Summary Judgment by the United States of America at 9-11, Mohamed I, 
539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 07-02798); Redacted, Unclassified 
Brief for Intervenor-Appellee the United States at 15-24, Mohamed II, 563 
F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-15693). 
229. Mohamed I, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1134-36. 
230. Mohamed II, 563 F.3d at 1009. 
231. Id. at 1000-06. 
232. Id. at 1004-06. 
233. Id. at 1004 (―[W]hatever power the United States Constitution 
envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy 
organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all 
three branches when individual liberties are at stake.‖ (citations omitted)). 
234. Id. 
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plaintiff‘s need for the information is a key determinant in the 
scope of the court‘s inquiry.235  On remand, the panel ordered 
that the Government assert the state secrets privilege only 
with respect to particular secret evidence, and not with respect 
to the entire case.236  The panel also ordered the district court 
to determine whether the plaintiff‘s case could proceed without 
privileged evidence.237  Thus under the panel ruling, and 
consistent with the Reynolds cases above, the plaintiff‘s case 
could potentially proceed on alternative, non-privileged 
material and information about the extraordinary rendition 
program. 
The Government sought en banc review of the panel 
decision, repackaging the arguments it relied upon below.238  
The Government may have backed off its claim that the state 
secrets privilege is a constitutional doctrine, however, merely 
alluding to the President‘s responsibility to protect national 
security and not specifically invoking Article II.239  As of this 
writing, the case is pending before the full Ninth Circuit. 
Thus the Government‘s position in the cases regarding 
these two central post-9/11 clandestine programs is 
characterized by a neglect of any plaintiff interest or need for 
evidence, extraordinary deference to the Government, no 
consideration of whether or how cases might proceed without 
privileged evidence, and complete dismissal whenever the 
Government asserts that the very subject of a case is a state 
secret.  And while these are also characteristics of the Totten 
cases, the Government has intensified them in the post-9/11 
cases in part by claiming that the state secrets privilege is a 
constitutional doctrine. 
The next section explores more how these characteristics 
expand the characteristics in the Totten cases, why that 
expansion is significant, and why it is wrong. 
 
235. Id. at 1003. 
236. Id. at 1009. 
237. Id. 
238. Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, Mohamed II, 563 
F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-15693). 
239. Id. at 10-11.  Based on oral arguments before the en banc Ninth 
Circuit, the more sweeping version of the state secrets privilege is apparently 
still in play at the Ninth Circuit.  See Audio file: Oral argument in Mohamed 
v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/ 
view_subpage.php?pk_id=0000004702. 
41
2010] THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE 819 
 
IV.  The Post-9/11 State Secrets Privilege and its Problems 
 
The Government‘s new and expanded position on the state 
secrets privilege in the post-9/11 cases lacks a solid basis in law 
and creates several significant constitutional problems.  This 
section explores four defining characteristics of the 
Government‘s new position and explains how they lack support 
or create problems.  First it explains why the Government‘s 
position that the state secrets privilege is a constitutional 
doctrine lacks a basis in law.  Next, it explains why the 
Government‘s position encouraging more deferential judicial 
scrutiny of its claims lacks a basis in law.  Third, it considers 
some of the problems with the Government‘s position that the 
courts should ignore plaintiffs‘ interests.  And finally, it 
explores some of the problems with the Government‘s position 
that courts must dismiss cases where the very subject matter is 
a state secret. 
This section demonstrates why the Government‘s 
extraordinary new position on the state secrets privilege is 
unsound, and why any effort to rein in the Government‘s use of 
the state secrets privilege must account for each of these four 
characteristics. 
 
A. State Secrets as a Constitutional Doctrine 
 
As we have seen, the Government has argued in the post-
9/11 cases that the state secrets privilege is rooted in the 
Constitution.  This argument is not only novel, it is baseless.  
Neither the origins of the state secrets privilege nor the cases 
upon which the Government relies support its claim. 
Nothing in either Totten or Reynolds suggests that the 
state secrets privilege has roots in the President‘s Article II 
powers.240  As we have seen, the Totten bar derived from the 
practical policy considerations based on the nature of secret 
contracts with the Government, and the Reynolds privilege 
 
240. See Brief of Professors of Constitutional Law, Federal Jurisdiction, 
and Foreign Relations Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Mohamed and 
Urging Reversal at 3, Mohamed II, 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-
15693) (arguing that the state secrets privilege is an evidentiary privilege, 
not a constitutional doctrine). 
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evolved as a common law evidentiary privilege.  The 
Government‘s novel claim in El-Masri that ―the state secrets 
privilege is rooted in, and is an aspect of, the powers granted to 
the President by Article II of the Constitution,‖241 and the 
Fourth Circuit‘s adoption of that position,242 simply has no 
basis in law. 
The Government‘s claim and the Fourth Circuit‘s ruling in 
El-Masri were based upon the President‘s Article II powers ―in 
the field of foreign relations‖ and the presumed role that the 
state secrets privilege played in furthering those powers.243  
But no court had previously linked the state secrets privilege to 
presidential powers ―in the field of foreign relations‖ (or, for 
that matter, any other Article II powers) in this way.  Perhaps 
the closest the courts have come to this link is in United States 
v. Nixon,244 the case relied upon by both the Government and 
the Fourth Circuit.  That case, however, merely discussed 
Reynolds and the Reynolds privilege in passing dicta, and 
notably, state secrets was not at issue.245  The link in that case 
between the presidential powers and the state secrets doctrine 
was only a spatial one: the Court merely discussed the 
President‘s powers and the Reynolds case in back-to-back 
paragraphs.246  The Nixon Court made no explicit link, much 
less the link that the Government and Fourth Circuit made, 
between the two. 
 In El-Masri, the Fourth Circuit also relied upon Reynolds 
in concluding that the state secrets privilege is rooted in the 
Constitution.247  The Fourth Circuit wrote that ―Reynolds itself 
suggested that the state secrets doctrine allowed the Court to 
avoid the constitutional conflict that might have arisen had the 
judiciary demanded that the Executive disclose highly sensitive 
 
241. Brief of the Appellee 8, El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th 
Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1667) (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 
(1974)). 
242. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 303-04. 
243. Brief of the Appellee 8, El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th 
Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1667) (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)). 
244. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
245. Id. at 710-11. 
246. Id. 
247. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 303. 
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military secrets.‖248  But Reynolds had nothing to do with state 
secrets as a constitutional doctrine.  As the Reynolds Court 
clearly noted, it did not rule on this question.249  Instead, the 
passage that the Fourth Circuit relied upon from Reynolds 
summarized the Government’s claim in that case.250  The 
Reynolds Court avoided ruling on this claim,251 not on the 
―constitutional conflict that might have arisen.‖252  And it 
avoided this claim merely because it found a narrower ground 
for its decision.253  The Fourth Circuit‘s use of Reynolds—that 
the Court‘s failure to address the government‘s claim amounts 
to an endorsement of that claim—simply distorts that case.254 
Finally, the Government relied upon United States v. 
Marchetti to support its argument that the privilege has a 
constitutional basis.255  But even by the Government‘s own 
reckoning, that case only holds that intelligence gathering is 
within the President‘s Article II powers.256  It says nothing 
about withholding state secrets as derived from Article II 
powers. 
Thus the Government‘s claim about the constitutional 
basis of the state secrets privilege, which it continues to press, 
lacks a basis in law.  Far worse, the Government has used this 
claim to argue further that the constitutional basis of the state 
secrets privilege crowds out any meaningful judicial review of 
the Government‘s assertion of the privilege and any 
consideration of plaintiffs‘ interests.257  The Government‘s 
 
248. Id. 
249. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953). 
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
252. See id. 
253. Id. 
254. Id. 
255. Brief of the Appellee at 9, El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 
(4th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1667) (quoting United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 
1309, 1315 (4th Cir. 1972)). 
256. Id. (―Gathering intelligence information and the other activities of 
the [CIA], including clandestine affairs against other nations, are all within 
the President‘s constitutional responsibility for the security of the Nation as 
the Chief Executive and as Commander in Chief of our Armed forces.‖ 
(quoting United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1315 (4th Cir. 1972)). 
257. Brief of the Appellee at 5, El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 
(4th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1667); see also id. at 14 (―Thus, the state secrets 
privilege has a constitutional foundation, is interposed as a matter of policy 
by the Executive Branch in order to further important foreign policy and 
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position, then, unbalances the carefully weighed separation of 
powers in our Constitution by virtually eliminating the 
judiciary from consideration of these cases.258  Moreover, as 
discussed below, it runs up against plaintiffs‘ constitutional 
interests in access to the courts. 
 
B. State Secrets as Curtailing Judicial Review 
 
In the post-9/11 cases, the Government has argued for 
unprecedented judicial deference.  The Government‘s position 
hit a high point in El-Masri, when it argued that the 
constitutional basis for the state secrets privilege virtually 
eliminated any role for the courts. 
But as we have seen, Reynolds contemplated a meaningful 
role for the judiciary in examining the Government‘s assertions 
of the state secrets privilege, while also balancing the need for 
secrecy: 
 
Judicial control over the evidence in a case 
cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive 
officers.  Yet we will not go so far as to say that 
the court may automatically require a complete 
disclosure to the judge before the claim of 
privilege will be accepted in any case.  It may be 
possible to satisfy the court, from all the 
circumstances of the case, that there is a 
reasonable danger that compulsion of the 
evidence will expose military matters which, in 
the interest of national security, should not be 
divulged.  When this is the case, the occasion for 
the privilege is appropriate, and the court should 
 
national security concerns, is absolute when properly invoked, and can be 
asserted at any point in litigation when the privilege is needed in order to 
protect state secrets from disclosure, either purposeful or inadvertent.‖); id. 
at 16 (―Because the decision to assert the privilege for secrets of state 
involves a policy determination on a matter constitutionally committed to the 
Executive Branch, the scope of the inquiry undertaken by the Judicial 
Branch when the claim is interposed is very limited.‖). 
258. See generally Amanda Frost, The State Secret Privilege and 
Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931 (2007) (examining in greater 
detail the state secrets privilege‘s implications for separation-of-powers 
principles). 
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not jeopardize the security which the privilege is 
meant to protect by insisting upon an 
examination of the evidence, even by the judge 
alone, in chambers.259 
 
Under Reynolds, the court determines whether the 
Government‘s claim meets the technical requirements of the 
privilege.  If the Government properly invoked the privilege, 
then the court evaluates the depth of its own probe into the 
assertion, based on the plaintiff‘s need for the underlying 
information.  At this step, courts have reviewed in camera the 
requisite affidavits and the underlying evidence and materials 
sought to be excluded.  The courts have even required a public 
defense of the claim of privilege.  The depth of the probe 
depends on the plaintiff‘s need for the evidence.  Finally, the 
court determines whether and how the case will proceed 
without the privileged evidence. 
This is a far cry from the extreme judicial deference that 
the Government proposes in the post-9/11 cases, especially 
when the Government argues against virtually any role for the 
courts, because the privilege is rooted in Article II principles.260 
 
C. State Secrets as Negating Plaintiffs’ Interests 
  
The Government and some courts have moved toward 
eliminating consideration of a plaintiff‘s need, or of any 
plaintiff interest in the litigation, as part of the state secrets 
calculus.  They argue and hold that the state secrets privilege 
is absolute and that a plaintiff‘s interest has no role in applying 
the privilege—there is no balancing test for the state secrets 
privilege.  This argument, however, is belied by Reynolds itself, 
and it runs up against plaintiffs‘ constitutional interests in 
pursuing their claims. 
Under Reynolds, a plaintiff‘s need for the underlying 
evidence plays an important role in the court‘s evaluation of an 
assertion of the state secrets privilege; it alone determines how 
closely the court should scrutinize the Government‘s claim.  ―In 
each case, the showing of necessity which is made will 
 
259. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953). 
260. Frost, supra note 258, at 1955-56. 
46http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/23
824 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
determine how far the court should probe in satisfying itself 
that the occasion for invoking the privilege is appropriate.‖261 
As described more fully above, courts have found that a 
plaintiff‘s need ranges from desperate—where the sought-after 
evidence was necessary to establish standing or a prima facie 
case—to insignificant—where alternative, non-privileged 
evidence and information permitted a case to move forward.  
Courts have adjusted their scrutiny of the Government‘s state 
secrets assertion accordingly, balancing the Government‘s 
interest in secrecy against the plaintiff‘s interest in judicial 
redress. 
The Government‘s arguments against considering a 
plaintiff‘s interests confuse or conflate the two critical steps in 
the Reynolds framework.  In the first step, determining how to 
scrutinize the assertion of the Government‘s claim, the court‘s 
calibration turns only on the plaintiff‘s need.262  But in the 
second step, once the court has probed the Government‘s claim 
and determined that the privilege applies, the plaintiff‘s need 
becomes irrelevant and ―even the most compelling necessity 
cannot overcome the claim of privilege.‖263 
The Government has argued, and some courts have held, 
that a plaintiff‘s need is not relevant and that the state secrets 
privilege involves no balancing of interests.264  This argument 
confuses the irrelevancy of a plaintiff‘s interest in the second 
step and of a plaintiff‘s need overall.  It results in a position 
that takes a plaintiff‘s need out of the state secrets calculus—a 
result inconsistent with Reynolds itself. 
 
D. Dismissal Where the Very Subject Matter is a State Secret 
 
Finally, the Government has argued consistently in the 
 
261. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
264. See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 305-06 (4th Cir. 
2007) (―The degree to which such a reviewing court should probe depends in 
part on the importance of the assertedly privileged information to the 
position of the party seeking it. . . .  Moreover, no attempt is made to balance 
the need for secrecy of the privileged information against a party‘s need for 
the information‘s disclosure . . . .‖) (citations omitted).  In an opinion stated 
somewhat confusingly, the court apparently declined to consider, or to review, 
the district court‘s consideration of the plaintiff‘s need. 
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post-9/11 cases that courts should dismiss the cases because 
their very subject matter are state secrets.  The Government 
supports this claim largely on the basis of the Totten cases.  To 
be clear, this claim is substantially stronger than the claim 
that a case should be dismissed because the plaintiff cannot 
establish standing or a prima facie case, or because the 
defendant cannot defend the case, as a result of privileged 
evidence.  The latter claim, affirmed by the Reynolds cases, is 
an evidentiary claim.  It protects evidence, not information, 
and allows the plaintiff to establish his or her case with 
alternative, non-privileged evidence.  If no such evidence exists, 
then, as with any other evidentiary privilege, the claim may be 
dismissed. 
But the former claim—the Government‘s claim in the post-
9/11 cases—is an absolute ban on litigation dealing with 
certain issues or programs, even if non-privileged evidence 
exists to establish a claim.  This claim operates more like the 
justiciability doctrine than an evidentiary privilege and, by the 
Government‘s reckoning, allows the Government to dodge suits 
with very little judicial oversight.  Indeed, this claim is 
problematic for three reasons: it lacks a solid basis in law, it 
confuses evidence and information, and it undermines a 
plaintiff‘s fundamental right to access the courts. 
 
1.   The Paucity of Legal Support 
 
The Government‘s argument in the post-9/11 cases—that 
the case must be dismissed because the very subject matter of 
the lawsuit is a state secret—has no support in the law of state 
secrets.  The cases that created the privilege cannot carry the 
weight of this extraordinary claim, and the more recent cases 
most often cited in support of this claim are themselves built 
upon empty analysis. 
First and most clearly, the claim has no basis in Reynolds 
or Totten.  As we have seen, Reynolds is an evidentiary 
privilege.  Properly invoked, the Reynolds privilege permits a 
party to establish facts based on alternative, non-privileged 
evidence.  Reynolds itself mentioned alternative, non-privileged 
evidence upon which the plaintiffs might have developed their 
48http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/23
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case.265  Reynolds authorizes dismissal only when a plaintiff 
cannot establish a case without privileged evidence.  Neither 
its holding nor its reasoning supports dismissal when the very 
subject matter of the litigation is a state secret.266 
Totten also does not support the claim of privilege.  As we 
have seen, Totten provides a narrow ban on litigating secret 
spy contracts with the Government.  It is based on unique 
policy considerations that apply only in such cases, and not 
more generally to any secret or clandestine government 
programs.267  As discussed in more detail above, the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed this understanding of Totten in Tenet v. Doe 
in 2005. 
Reynolds and Totten together cannot provide a basis for 
dismissing a case because the very subject matter of the case is 
a state secret.  As we have seen, the Supreme Court 
unanimously held in Tenet v. Doe that the Reynolds evidentiary 
privilege and the Totten bar are two distinct principles, even if 
they share some common ground.268  If neither alone supports 
the claim that a case may be dismissed because its very subject 
matter is a state secret—and if, as explained above, they 
represent two very different principles that cannot be 
aggregated—then even together they cannot support such a 
claim. 
Moreover, the recent cases are themselves built upon 
empty analysis and, when read closely, provide no solid support 
for this claim.  For example, the Government frequently cited 
Kasza in support of its argument.  While the Ninth Circuit in 
Kasza dismissed the entire case because its very subject matter 
was a state secret,269 the cases it cited—Reynolds, Totten, 
Farnsworth Cannon, and Weston v. Lockheed Missiles & Space 
Co.—do not support this holding.  Reynolds and Totten do not 
support it for the reasons discussed above.  Farnsworth 
Cannon was an en banc summary affirmance of the district 
 
265. 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953). 
266. See Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1001 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(discussing why Reynolds does not support dismissal because the very subject 
matter of the suit is a state secret). 
267. Id. (discussing why Totten does not support dismissal because the 
very subject matter of the suit is a state secret). 
268. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2005). 
269. Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1170. 
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court‘s unpublished dismissal on the pleadings, without 
citation to a single case or authority, and with rather 
ambiguous language about the precise basis of its ruling.270  
The court in Weston did not even rule on this issue.271  It 
merely stated in dicta that ―the state secrets privilege alone 
can be the basis for dismissal of an entire case.‖272  This is 
ambiguous support, at best, for Kasza‘s holding.  It is hardly 
the stuff of sound legal doctrine.  And just in case there were 
any questions about Kasza‘s ruling, the Ninth Circuit recently 
disavowed it in Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.273 and 
ruled that this theory cannot provide the basis for complete 
dismissal.274 
Other cases regularly cited in support of this claim are 
similarly weak and merely create something like a case-law 
house of cards.  For example, the court in Fitzgerald v. 
Penthouse International, Ltd. upheld a dismissal because the 
very subject matter of the case was a state secret.275  But it 
only relied upon Totten and Farnsworth Cannon in support of 
this conclusion.276  Similarly, the court in Zuckerbraun v. 
General Dynamics Corp. merely cited Reynolds and Totten in 
support of its conclusion that dismissal was required because 
the very subject matter of the case was a state secret.277  The 
court in Bowles v. United States merely cited Fitzgerald,278  and 
the court in Bareford v. General Dynamics Corp. cited 
Farnsworth Cannon and Bowles.279  The court in DTM 
 
270. Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 281 (4th Cir. 
1980) (en banc) (per curiam) (―[A]ny attempt on the part of the plaintiff to 
establish a prima facie case would so threaten disclosure of state secrets that 
the overriding interest of the United States and the preservation of its state 
secrets precludes any further attempt to pursue this litigation.‖). 
271. Weston v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 881 F.2d 814, 816 (9th 
Cir. 1989). 
272. Id. 
273. 563 F.3d 992, 1002 n.5 (9th Cir.), amended and superseded by 579 
F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), petition for reh’g en banc granted by 586 F.3d 1108. 
274. Id. at 1003. 
275. 776 F.2d 1236, 1243 (4th Cir. 1985). 
276. Id. at 1241-42. 
277. Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 547-48 (2d Cir. 
1991). 
278. Bowles v. United States, 950 F.2d 154, 156 (4th Cir. 1991). 
279. Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1143 (5th Cir. 
1992), vacated in part, No. 91-2432, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 25805 (5th Cir. 
Oct. 14, 1992). 
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Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp. cited only Fitzgerald,280  and 
the court in Sterling v. Tenet cited Fitzgerald, Farnsworth 
Cannon, and DTM Research.281  Other cases, including El-
Masri, recycle these cases, occasionally adding some of the 
Reynolds cases in support of the claim that the state secrets 
privilege may require complete dismissal of a case.282  Of course 
the Reynolds cases provide no support for the claim that courts 
must dismiss cases in which the very subject matter is a state 
secret.  They hold only that courts must dismiss cases in which 
evidence necessary to establish standing or a prima facie case 
is protected.  Thus the case support for this claim is quite 
tenuous, ultimately turning on recycled citations to cases that 
themselves lack a foundation in the law. 
 
2.   The Confusion Between Evidence and Information 
 
The sweeping claim here—that courts must dismiss cases 
in which the very subject matter is a state secret—confuses 
evidence and information by applying an evidentiary privilege 
to sources well beyond any disputed evidence but that 
nevertheless supply the information in the evidence.  This 
curtails a plaintiff‘s ability to establish a claim through 
alternative, non-privileged material and expands the Totten 
ban or the Reynolds privilege (or both) well beyond the scope of 
those rulings. 
Courts that have upheld dismissals on this basis have 
banned all evidence, privileged or not, so long as the 
information in that evidence might relate to a state secret.  
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. illustrates the 
strangeness of this position.283  In that case, the Government 
 
280. DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp., 245 F.3d 327, 334 (4th Cir. 
2001). 
281. Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 347-48 (4th Cir. 2005). 
282. See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 306-07 (4th Cir. 
2007).  El-Masri also cites Tenet v. Doe in support of this claim.  The Court 
wrote that Doe ―approvingly quoted Reynolds‘s discussion of Totten as a 
matter in which dismissal on the pleadings was appropriate because the very 
subject matter of the action was a state secret.‖  Id. at 306.  But as discussed 
above, nothing in Doe suggests that the Totten bar, or any like version of the 
state secrets privilege, applies outside the narrow facts of that case. 
283. 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009), amended and superseded by 579 F.3d 
949 (9th Cir. 2009), petition for reh’g en banc granted by 586 F.3d 1108. 
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argued that the court should dismiss the case because the very 
subject matter involved a state secret.  But by the time the case 
reached the Ninth Circuit, the very subject matter of the case, 
the Government‘s extraordinary rendition program, was well 
known by the public and even acknowledged by the 
Government and government officials in widely publicized and 
non-privileged sources.284  Yet the Government‘s position would 
have prevented the plaintiff from establishing his claim based 
on these alternative, non-privileged sources.  Bizarrely, the 
Government‘s position would have even prevented the plaintiff 
from telling his own story in pleadings, discovery, or court.  The 
Government‘s assertion of the evidentiary privilege, then, 
would have cut off not only all privileged evidence, but all 
―secret‖ information about the extraordinary rendition 
program. 
This position, adopted in El-Masri,285 represents an 
extraordinary expansion of both the Reynolds privilege and the 
Totten ban.  As a claim of evidentiary privilege under Reynolds, 
it means that for the state secrets privilege—alone among 
evidentiary privileges—the information, not the evidence, 
would be paramount.  As a result, the Reynolds privilege would 
stretch beyond all recognition and morph into a rule of 
justiciability.  Alternatively, as a claim under Totten, it means 
that any government program, not just government spy 
contracts, might be a state secret.  This would stretch the logic 
of Totten and subject any government action to a claim of state 
secrets.  Either way—as a claim under the Reynolds privilege 
or as a claim under the Totten ban—this position would create 
an absolute privilege with no definable boundaries.  Taken 
with the Government‘s other extraordinary positions, it means 
that anytime the Government claims that the very subject 
matter of a suit involves a state secret, the case must be 
dismissed. 
 
3.   The Failure to Consider the Plaintiff‘s Interests 
 
Finally, this position runs up against a plaintiff‘s 
constitutional interests in access to the courts.  Plaintiffs have 
 
284. See generally Sadat, supra note 206. 
285. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 303. 
52http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/23
830 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
a fundamental right, rooted in due process and equal protection 
principles, against government interference with access to the 
courts.  The Supreme Court most recently affirmed this well-
established right in Tennessee v. Lane.286  The Court in that 
case upheld Congress‘s authority under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to require state and local governments 
to accommodate persons with disabilities by providing access to 
the courts.287  The Court ruled that Congress could so regulate 
state and local governments under Section 5, because the 
underlying right, access to the courts, was fundamental.288 
Just as the plaintiff in Lane had a fundamental right to 
access the court, so too do the plaintiffs in cases potentially 
involving state secrets.  The Government‘s position in the post-
9/11 cases, however, threatens to curtail this interest, cutting it 
off entirely without any meaningful judicial review. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
The Government‘s position, and at least one circuit court‘s 
ruling, on the state secrets privilege in the cases challenging 
the Government‘s clandestine post-9/11 programs represents a 
dramatic expansion of the privilege.  This expansion has four 
characteristics.  First, the Government now claims that the 
state secrets privilege has a constitutional pedigree.  Next, the 
Government argues for great judicial deference when 
examining assertions of the state secrets privilege.  Third, the 
Government has argued for complete dismissal, on the 
pleadings, when the very subject matter of a case involves state 
secrets.  And finally, the Government argues that a plaintiff‘s 
interest should not play a role in evaluating state secrets 
claims. 
The last three characteristics simply continue a trend in 
 
286. 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
287. Id. at 533-34. 
288. Id. at 532-33 (―The Due Process Clause also requires the States to 
afford certain civil litigants a ‗meaningful opportunity to be heard‘ by 
removing obstacles to their full participation in judicial proceedings.‖) (citing 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 
102 (1996)).  International law recognizes a similar right, the right to an 
effective remedy.  Brief for Redress and the International Commission of 
Jurists as Amici Curiae in Support of the Plaintiffs-Appellants, Mohamed II, 
563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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one line of cases on the state secrets privilege.  But the 
Government‘s new claim that the state secrets privilege is a 
constitutional doctrine amplifies those characteristics.  This 
means that the Government now presses a position that courts 
should completely dismiss any action, with little or no judicial 
review, when the Government asserts that the very subject of 
the case involves a state secret. 
Efforts to reform the privilege must take account of these 
characteristics.  Current proposed legislation falls far short.  
Congress must go much further to address these characteristics 
if it truly seeks to control the effects of the Government‘s 
sweeping state secrets assertions. 
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